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This paper presents an analysis of the effects of market structure on the propensity of firms to
dump goods. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, this paper finds that firms in more
domestically competitive markets are more prone to dump unilaterally than firms in less competitive
markets. This dumping is not predatory but may result in dumping at prices below average cost
and higher profits for the firms that unilaterally dump.
The existence of dumping in international markets is ubiquitous. Between July 1985 and
June of 1986, Australia, Canada, the European Community, and the US alone pursued a total of
568 outstanding antidumping actions involving 45 countries.1 Economic treatments of dumping,
however, have often treated the phenomenon as an aberration arising out of either sudden
unexpected demand fluctuations or barriers to trade. In fact, despite mounting evidence to the
contrary, the US continues to view dumping by other countries as evidence of firms in protected
overseas markets attempting to eliminate competitive domestic enterprises. This paper will
demonstrate, however, that contrary to the conventional wisdom, it is not true that more
monopolistic firms are likely to dump into competitive markets. Rather, in the absence of
protectionist barriers, firms in relatively competitive markets are far more prone to dump
unilaterally than more monopolistic firms. The dumping described here involves no predatory
behavior and arises simply from the profit maximizing interactions of firms in a Cournot
equilibrium. Furthermore, it will be shown that if a domestic market is sufficiently competitive,
domestic firms will dump at prices below average cost and may earn higher profits than firms in
less competitive markets.
1These numbers are from Jackson, Table 1.
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Before beginning the analysis, it is important to clearly define 'nat types of actions will be
categorized as dumping. Although there are many lay definitions of dumping, the standard
definition used by economists and law makers will be the one adoped in this paper, i.e. price
discrimination between international markets. Despite the general consensus that price
discrimination in domestic markets should not be prosecuted, there are a variety of national laws
and international treaties designed to facilitate the detection and preveition of international price
discrimination. For example, the General Agreement on Trade anc Tariffs (GATT) considers
products dumped if they are offered for export at a price below the ;omestic price or below an
estimate of what the price "should" be based on the production costs.= f dumping is detected and
determined to cause "material injury" to the domestic firms, GATE permits countries to levy
countervailing duties equal to the "margin of dumping" on the dumped goods.
One can broadly group the standard explanations of dunring into two categories:
oligopolized (or monopolized) home market arguments (e.g. Viner, Yrnema, and Eichengreen and
van der Ven) and fluctuating demand arguments (e.g. Ethier and Dav-es and McGuinness). The
oligopolized home market approach usually postulates firms in an oligopolistic home market who
are protected from foreign competition by some sort of trade barrier ard then sell into a relatively
competitive foreign market. Because the home firms cannot raise prices in the competitive foreign
market, they practice price discrimination and sell at a lower price abroad. The problem with this
explanation is that it fails to deal with many of the stylized facts that strround dumping cases. For
example, although many US antidumping actions are directed against Japan, Japanese trade
barriers are probably as low or lower than US barriers.3
Furthermore, it is very hard to make a prima facie case that Japnese dumping is caused by
firms in concentrated Japanese markets interacting with competitive US markets. Most research on
international industrial concentration indicates that Japanese markets are less concentrated than US
2According to Article 2 of the Anti-Durnping Code in the GATIT treaty, a product is xxnsidered to be dumped "if the
export price of the product exported from one country to another is less than the conparable price. . .for the like
pr~~t when destined for consumption in the exporting country."
3Se, for example, Saxonhouse p. 231 in The Political Economy of Japan.
mariets. For example, in 1982 the 100 largest manufacturers in the United States accounted for
32% of all shipments (in value terms) whereas the same number for Japan in 1980 was 27%.4 The
lower Japanese firm concentration statistics are not only apparent in aggregate data but also in
specific industries where dumping is alleged to have occurred. One such case is the recent
prelmiinary finding by the Commerce Department that Japanese microdisks are being dumped
despite relatively fierce competition between Japanese producers.5 Since 3.5 inch disks have long
been standardized and tend to be rather homogeneous in nature, it is difficult to believe that any
particular firm could exercise its market power by significantly raising its price.6 Furthermore,
with at least ten indigenous Japanese floppy disk manufacturers, the low US price cannot easily be
explained using arguments based on competitive US markets or predation against US firms.
Although demand fluctuation arguments do not have the same dependence on market
structure considerations as oligopolized home market arguments, their failure to address the
question of why dumping often continues unabated for many years raises some cause for concern
about their overall applicability.7 Demand fluctuation explanations generally postulate a firm facing
a world demand curve that fluctuates according to some unpredictable process. Since firms do not
know ex ante whether the world will be in a high or low demand situation, they must set expected
marginal revenue equal to expected marginal cost. Unfortunately, this means that sometimes the
realized world price will be below expected costs, and thus the firm will engage in dumping.
4Census of Manufacturers, Concentration Ratios in Manufacturing, 1982, and Uelusa, Masu in The Political
Economy of Japan p. 486. Using 1963 data, the last year in which the Japanese and US data are comparable, Caves
and Uekusa (1976 p. 19) examined concentration ratios in the two countries at the 3-digit industry level. They
constructed weighted concentration ratios covering the 512 sectors in Japan and 417 sectors in the US by
multiplying the 4-finm concentration ratios in each sector by total sales in that secto and then dividing by total
sales. Based on this calculation, they found that the weighted concentration ratio came to 35.4% for Japan and 40.9%
for the US. I repeated this calculation for the US with 1977 Census of Manufacturers data and found that the
weighked 4-firm concentration ratio had fallen slightly to 39.3% in the intervening foeen years. Although changes
in dms definitions make it difficult to update Japanese data, the evidence presented in Uekusa (1982 pp. 29-31)
suggtsts that over the same period the number for Japan increased by about 2 percenage points. Even given these
changes, J.apanese industries still appear either as concentrated or slightly less concentrated than US industries.
5See "Ruling Confirmed that Japan Dumps Microdisks in U.S.," The Wall Streer Journal, Feb. 8, 1989, and
Elecaronic Business, May 15, 1988.
6"Floppy Disk Makers Competing on Numerous Fronts: Denon, JVC, Konica, Sony, KAO, Maxel, Fuji Film,
Tosih, Mitsumi, Alps," Office Equipment and Products, vol. 17, Feb. 1988.
'7Danm (1970 p. 171), for example, notes that "dumping, at least of the type against which antidumping duties are
going to be imposed, is typically permanent."
These models suggest that dumping is a phenomenon that should appear primarily in economic
downturns. However, demand fluctuation explanations cannot convincingly explain why dumping
occurs in rapidly expanding industries as well as depressed ones. Fcr example, considering the
explosive growth in microdisk sales over the last nine years, it wound be difficult to argue that
dumping by Japanese firms has resulted from insufficient demand.
One model that does not quite fit into either category is the reciprocal dumping model
developed by Brander and Krugman (1983). Their model postulates a monopolist in each of two
countries that can export to the foreign market if it pays a certain per u.it transportation cost. They
then showed that since the marginal cost of exporting is higher than :bat of domestic sales, each
monopolist will absorb some of the transportation costs in order to sell in the foreign market.
Because even the partial absorption of international transportation costs is tantamount to dumping,
reciprocal dumping arises in the Brander-Krugman model from the very natural desire of firms to
exploit rents in foreign markets. Methodologically, this approach is very attractive because it
generates dumping without relying on protectionism or other specific 'institutional" explanations.
However, since dumping tends to be more of a unilateral problem rather than a reciprocal problem,
it is difficult to see how these results explain the unilateral dumping that has become so
commonplace.
This paper extends the original analysis of Brander and Krrgman by examining how
unequal numbers of firms in different countries can affect the nattern of dumping. Not
surprisingly, the reciprocal dumping result of the Brander-Krugman model is robust with regard to
increases in the numbers of firms in the equilibrium. However, it can be shown that if one
county's market has a critical number of firms in it, then the domestic price will be driven down
sufficiently to prevent foreign entry, but domestic firms will continu to dump into the foreign
market. Thus, sufficient competition in one country can cause that cnentry to unilaterally dump
into another country's market. The presence of this form of unilateral dumping in a wide class of
Cournot models is demonstrated in the following section and forms the basis for much of the
reminder of the analysis.
Dunping and Bilateral Intra-Industry Trade
Although most antidumping legislation is enacted with the intent of promoting trade, the
close interconnection between dumping and intra-industry trade is not well understood. It is well
known that the presence of transportation costs interferes with factor price equalization and the
formation of an integrated world economy. Our intuition suggests that in the presence of
transportation costs, competitive markets will set prices so that the price of a good in an exporting
country exactly equals the price of the good in the importing country plus the per unit
transportation cost. This leads us to believe that in the absence of barriers to trade other than
transportation costs, the FOB price in any country should be the same as the domestic price. Yet,
all of this intuition is contingent on the absence of two way or bilateral intra-industry trade.
Specifically, as Proposition 1 demonstrates, in any situation in which there is bilateral intra-
industry trade in the presence of positive transportation costs, then the firms in at least one of the
two countries will engage in dumping. The connection between intra-industry trade, transportation
costs, and dumping can best be understood by first noting that if the FOB price in one country is
greater than or equal to the domestic price and transportation costs are positive, then the only way
that firms in that country can export without dumping is if the domestic price is lower than the
foreign market price. However, since it is not possible for the domestic price to be lower than the
foreign price in every market, at least one of the countries must be dumping if all countries export
the good. This statement is formalized and proved below.
Proposition 1 (Dumping is essential for bilateral intra-industry trade with transportation costs):
If transportation costs are positive, then bilateral intra-industry trade of a homogeneous
good is not possible without dumping.
Proof:
Let p and p* represent the prices in the domestic and foreign markets respectively, and let t
represent the per unit transportation cost between the two markets. D~umping by home country
firms occurs if the domestic price is greater than the FOB price or if
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(1) p>p*-t
and by the foreign firms if '
(1') p*>p -t
If fi:ms do not dump then
p 5p* - t andp*< p-t
or
0 < -2t,
which is a contradiction.
This form of dumping does not appear in standard trade models because bilateral intra-
industry trade is usuall; not compatible with positive transportation costs. For example, in the
Heckscher-Ohlin model, bilateral intra-industry trade can occur but does not constitute dumping
because of the absence of transportation costs. If this model is then modified to allow for positive
transportation costs, dumping again will not appear because the presence of the transportation costs
eliminates bilateral intra-industry trade. Thus, although bilateral intra-industry trade occurs in
actuality and Proposition 1 suggests that this implies that dumping must be widespread, without a
suitable trade model it is difficult to know what conditions make a country prone to dump and
whether that dumping will be reciprocal or unilateral. Since relaxing assumptions about perfectly
competitive markets within industries seems the easiest way to generate bilateral intra-industry
trade in the presence of transportation costs, most of the remaining analysis will be based on a
partial equilibrium analysis of a given industry that extends and builds on the model of "reciprocal
dumping" developed by Brander and Krugman. 8
Consider two countries that trade with each other. Let the total quantity of a good sold in
the domestic country be denoted by Z, and by Z* in the foreign country, and assume that the price
in either country is determined solely by the total amount of the good available in that country's
8Wivemver possible, the original Brander-Kmugman notation has been used.
market. This implies that the price in the domestic market, p(Z), is solely a function of the goods
available in that market, and the price in the foreign market, p*(Z*), does not have any relation to
conditions in the domestic market. Furthermore, assume that
im p(Z)= lim p*(Z*) =0
Z-+- Z*--o
Since Brander and Krugman dealt primarily with a symmetric case with only one firm in
each country, there was no need to specify individual firm output in the original model.9
However, in order to add the asymmetry of different numbers of firms in each country, one must
modify the original Brander-Krugman notation somewhat. Let n represent the number of firms in
the home country and n* the number of firms in the foreign country. Domestic firm, i, produces xi
units of the good for the domestic market and xi* units of the good for the foreign market, while
foreign firm, j, produces yj units of the good for export and yj* units for its domestic market.
Furthermore, let
" *1 andy* 1"*
x = - xi, y = Eyj, x* =- xi*, and y* = -g yj*.n = 1 j= 1 i=.1  
j=1
All of the firms will have identical cost functions with constant marginal cost:10
For domestic firms: C(xi, xi*) = c(xi + xi*) + F for all i=1. .. n
For foreign firms: C(yj, yj*) = c(yj + yj*) + F for all j=1. .n*
Tramsportation costs are assumed to be of the Samuelson "iceberg" form, i.e. the marginal cost of
producing and exporting a good is assumed to be c/g where g is any number on the interval (0,1]
and represents the fraction of the good that arrives at the final destination. Therefore, the cost of
exporting a good is:
t = (note: c + t = c/g)
g
Firms export by selling goods to perfectly competitive exporters who sell the goods in turn to the
overseas market. Thus, if the price in the foreign market is p*', then a domestic firm selling abroad
9Wbile Brander and Krugman do mention that it would be possible to perform a similar analysis with a multifirm
model, they do not discuss any of the asymmetrical results that will occur with different numbers of firms in each
co.uty.
10As the form of the cost function suggests, firms must pay the fixed cost, F, regardless of whether they produce
any output.
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would only receive p* - t dollars for each unit sold. The FOB price, then, is simply the price of
the good in the overseas market minus the transport cost, t.A1
Each firm will play a Cournot quantity game by trying to select an output that maximizes
the firm's profits, subject to the production decision of the other firms. Thus, domestic and
fore:gn firm profits can be written as follows:
(2) xi = xip(Z) + xi*p*(Z*) - c(xi + xi*/g) - F for all i = 1...n
(3) 1nj* = yjp(Z) + yj*p*(Z*) - c(yj/g + yj*) - F for all j = 1..n*
Since the firms have constant marginal costs, the profit equations are additively separable in
domestic and foreign production. This means that sales in one country will not affect the sales or
price in the other country, and therefore, since there are no secondary effects from one market to
another, the comparative statics will be relatively simple. For the remainder of the analysis the
Nov'shek condition will be assumed to be binding in each market. Novshek (1985) has
demonstrated that in addition to the assumptions already made in the paper, if one restricts the
convexity of the inverse demand functions somewhat by specifying that
d[Zp(z)] = p'(Z) + Zp"(Z) 50,
then a Cournot equilibrium will exist. This condition basically specifies that the best response
curves are downward sloping in each firm's output, and thus if any one firm increases output, the
marginal revenue of the other firms will decrease. The reason for requiring that the Novshek
condition holds, as opposed to some other existence criterion, is that this condition also turns out
to be a sufficient condition to generate many of the results of this paper. Based on the Novshek
criterion, it will be possible to show that if the inverse demand functions are the same in two
countries, then the firms in a market with many home country firms (the flooded market) may
unilaterally dump into the market with fewer home country finns (the noni-flooded market).
lit culd also be thought of as including tariffs. However, since the point of this paper is to demonstrate how
unilaeal dumping can arise without government inuervenion, t has been assumed to be equal for both domestic and
fog firm.
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First, consider a situation in which all firms sell positive quantities in all markets.
Differentiating 2 and 3 with respect to production sold in the home country (xi and yj) and setting
these derivatives equal to zero yields:
(4) xx. = xip'(Z) + p(Z) - c = 0 for all i = 1. .. n
(5) x* =yjp'(Z) + p(Z) - c/g = 0 for all j = 1...n*
(6) Z= nx +n*y
and
(4",) xx.i = x*ip'(Z*) + p(Z*) - c/g = 0 for all i = 1..n
(5 y. 1 = y*jp'(Z*) + p(Z*) - c = 0 for all j = 1...n*
(6) Z* = nx* + n*y*
It zan be shown that because the Novshek condition holds, equations 4,5, and 6 generate a unique
equriliorium in the domestic market, and equations 4',5', and 6' are sufficient for uniqueness in the
foreign market.12 Furthermore, the symmetry of the equations guarantees that all firms from a
given country will produce the same amount of output in equilibrium, and therefore the notation
can be simplified by letting xi = x, xi* = x*, yj = y, and yj* = y*.
Brander and Krugman demonstrated that for the case in which n = n* = 1, each country's
firmn will dump into the other country's market. Proposition 2, below, demonstrates that this result
continues to be valid for all values of n and n* that are compatible with an interior solution. In
other words, provided that prices in each market are higher than the production and shipping costs
to that market, then bilateral intra-industry trade will occur and firms in each country will dump
into the other's market. The dumping in this case is reciprocal because firms in both countries
recognize that their profits will be higher by exporting and absorbing some of the transportation
coss than by not exporting at all.
12e Shapiro (1987 p. 7) for a more detailed discussion of the relationship between the Novshek condition and
uniqueness of equilibria.
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Proposition 2 (Reciprocal Dumping): If the inverse demand functions are equal in the two
markets (p(u) = p*(u) for all u 2 0) and all firms sell in both markets, then firms will carry
out "reciprocal dumping".
Proof:
Dumping by home country firms occurs if equation 1 is satisfied and by the foreign firms if
equation 1' is satisfied
Summing up equations 4 and 5 over all firms and setting them equal to the sum of equations 4' and
5' yields13
(7) (n+n*)p(Z) + (nx+n*y)p'(Z) - nc - n*c/g = (n+n*)p(Z*) + (nx*+n*y*)p'(Z*) - nc/g - n*c
If we let N = n + n*, we can rewrite equation 7 as
Np(Z) + Zp'(Z) = Np(Z*) + Z*p'(Z*) - nt + n*t
Without any loss of generality we can assume that there are at least as many domestic firms as
foreign firms or that n n*. Thi- implies that
Np(Z) + Zp'(Z) Np(Z*) + Z*p'(Z*),
and since
d[Np(Z) + Zp'(Z)]
dZ = (N+ 1)p(Z)+Zp"(Z) <0,
we know that Z Z*. But this means that p(Z) p(Z*) or
(8) p - t < p*.
Thus, it is clear that if n n* and foreign firms sell into the domestic market, then they will dump
into it.14
Now, to prove that firms in the flooded market will also dump, we first note that profit
maximization in both the foreign and domestic market implies that
p(Z) + xp'(Z) - c = p(Z*) + x*p'(Z*) - c/g, or
p(Z) + xp'(Z) = p(Z*) + x*p'(Z*) -t
1 3For the sake of clarity, I have included the arguments of p and p* in certain stages of this proof. However,
throughout the proof p = p(Z) and p* = p(Z*).14It is important to note here that the ability of firms in the non-flooded market to dump into the flooded market is
contingent on the condition that p>c/g. 'The price level in the domestic market is crucially dependent on the number
of domestic firms, and therefore if n is large enough there will be no foreign penetratio of the domestic market, but,
as Theorem 3 will demonstrate, domestic firms will nonetheless continue to dump into the foreign market.
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Dumping will occur if xp'(Z) < x*p'(Z*).
Suppose that this condition does not hold, then
xp'(Z) x*p'(Z*).
Recalling the Novshek condition and the fact that Z Z*, it is clear that Z*p'(Z*) Zp'(Z), or
(9) nx*p'(Z*) + n*y*p'(Z*) ? nxp'(Z) + n*yp'(Z).
But by the counter assumption, this equation means that
n*y*p'(Z*) 2 _n*yp'(Z), or y*p'(Z*) yp'(Z).
The first order conditions for profit maximization then imply that
p + yp' - c/g = p* + y*p*' - c, or
p -c/g p*-c.
which can be rewritten as
(10) p-t2p*
But this cannot be if equation 8 is true. Therefore xp'(Z) < x*p'(Z*) and p > p* - t.
Thus far, the analysis has been predicated on the assumption that no arbitrage can occur
between the two markets. However, there is no a priori reason to rul out the possibility that an
arbitrager might want to exploit the the international price differentials and ship goods from one
market to the other. Therefore, we now demonstrate that the presence of an arbitrager that moves
sirmmitaneously with the firms will not have any effect on this equilibrium. Let the arbitrager pick a
quantity A to ship from one of the markets to the other. Without a loss of generality, A can be
assumed to be the flow of goods from the domestic market to the foreign market. Thus, Ae [0, Z].
In this case, the arbitrager's profits will be
Suppose that the firms do not change their production decisions in the presence of the arbitrager.
Since the domestic firms are dumping we know that
p(Z*) - p(Z) - t <0
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But this means that the bracketed term in the profit equation is negative for all possible values of A
and that the arbitrager's optimal strategy is not to sell any output at all. Thus, if the firms continue
to pay their equilibrium strategies in the presence of the arbitrager, the arbitrager will ship nothing
and the equilibrium will be unaffected. The reason that arbitrage does not occur in this equilibrium
is that the dumping in this model arises because the firms absorb some of the transportation costs
and thereby prevent the price differential between the two markets from ever exceeding t.
Unilateral Dumping
The analysis in the previous section was based on the assumption of an interior solution,
i.e. that firms sell in both markets. This assumption was needed in the original Brander and
Krmgman paper because, with only one firm in each country, the only corner solution possible was
one in which transportation costs were so high that no trade whatsoever took place. In the multi-
firm case, however, while that trivial corner solution is still possible, there is also a more
interesting corner solution in which the firms in one country are not able export, but the firms in
the other country can and do export. The basic intuition here is that in any domestic market,
foreign firms act like high cost firms while domestic firms act like low cost firms. Hence, if there
are a sufficient number of low cost domestic firms, they can drive the domestic price down to a
level that is above their marginal cost but below the cost of production plus transportation. This
means that foreign firms cannot export to the domestic market but domestic firms can :till export
abroad. To see this more clearly, first note that if p is equal to c/g, then equation 5 indicates that
the foreign firms will not sell anything in the domestic market. Because p monotonically declines
in output and z p(Z) =0, there exists a unique Ze such that
(11) p(ZC)= c/g
We now want to find an nC such that a Cournot equilibrium with this number of firms will result in
the aggregate output of domestic firms equalling ZC. Ignoring the integer problem, equations 4, 6,
and 11 can be written as three equations in n, x, and Z that uniquely determine nc as shown below:
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nc..=C..-, where xc = _'Z
It is important to remember, however, that provided that there are less than nC firms in the foreign
market, the aggregate output of the foreign firms in the foreign market, n*y*, will be less than Zc
and the domestic firms will continue to export into the foreign market. In this situation, one would
find that the domestic price would equal c/g but the foreign price would be higher. As Proposition
3 demonstrates, this would result in unilateral dumping because the domestic firms would continue
to dump despite the inability of the foreign firms to penetrate the flooded domestic market.
Proposition 3 (Unilateral Dumping): If the flooded market has an autarkic price that is equal to
or less than c/g but the non-flooded market autarkic price is greater than c/g, then if p(u) =
p*(u) for u 0, no firms operating out of the non-flooded market will sell in the flooded
market and firms in the flooded market will dump into the non-flooded market.
Proof:
Suppose that in a state of autarky, p S c/g and p* > c/g. Since price in the domestic market is
below (or at most equal to) the marginal cost at which a foreign firm can export profitably, there
will be no foreign penetration of the domestic market. The proof that domestic firms will dump is
essentially the same as the proof of Proposition 1. Since p < p*, Z must be larger than Z*. Noting
that y 0, the rest of the proof is essentially the same as that of the second half of Proposition 1.
This result can best be understood by thinking of each market as containing both high cost
foreign firms and low cost domestic firms. To make the discussion a little clearer, call the home
country, "country A" and the foreign country, "country B". In a standard Cournot model with
constant marginal costs, low cost firms produce more output than high cost firms. Thus, for
example, if the firms selling in country A were ten low cost (country A) firms and one high cost
(country B) firm, the price in country A would be lower than if there were ten high cost (country
B) firms and only one low cost (country A) firm. By the same logic, with ten country A firms and
one countryB firm, the pricn country Bwould behigher than the price in country A. If there are
a sufficient number of country A firms then they will drive the country A price down to cost plus
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transportation cost, and no country B firms will be able to sell any output in country A. However,
since country A firms are high cost firms in country B's market, they will not produce as much as
they do for domestic consumption, and so the price in country B will be higher than in country A.
This will permit the firms in country A to export into country B but prevent the firms in country B
from exporting into country A. 15
One is tempted to think that a firm in the non-flooded market is necessarily going to earn
higher profits than a firm in the flooded market since dumping by firms in the flooded market
cannot drive the price in the non-flooded market below c/g, but firms in the flooded market must
face heavy competition by low cost firms at home. However, the ability of firms in the flooded
market to sell in two different markets can offset the losses of having a more competitive domestic
market and enable them to earn higher profits.16 Suppose that unilateral dumping occurs with nc
firmrs operating out of the flooded market. These firms will mark-up their production destined for
their. own market by t and will mark-up their production for sale in the non-flooded market by less
than t because we know from Proposition 3 that these firms must be dumping. Since the price in
the non-flooded market must be greater than the cost of producing and shipping the units into that
market (c/g), firms operating out of the non-flooded market must have higher mark-ups over cost
in their domestic market than firms in the flooded market have in their domestic market. This
creases a paradoxical situation in which the firms from the flooded market have lower mark-ups in
both markets but earn higher profits. This seemingly contradictory state of affairs can be
understood by recognizing that although the firms in the flooded market have a lower per unit
15A brief comment about welfare is in order. Since Brander and Krugman have already discussed the welfare
impications of dumping in detail, there is no need to investigate the welfare implications of dumping here.
Basically, dumping has two effects on welfare. The added competition improves wefae by lowering prices, but the
cross-hauling of goods between the countries reduces welfare. Brander and Krugnman show that a free-entry
equilibrium generates higher welfare than autarky. However, if transport costs are just high enough to prevent trade,
a mrginal drop in transportation costs will decrease welfare because it simply induces cross-hauling. This latter
argumnent also applies to the case of unilateral dumping, where a marginal drop in transportation costs may be
welfmr decreasing because it would generate cross-hauling by allowing firms in the non-flooded market to seil in the
flooded market without having a significant effect on prices.
16T'e rede may wish to verify that with a constant elasticity to scale demand curve the following parameter values
wili produce higher profits for domestic firms in an equilibrium in which they unilameraly dump:.
n=2, sa*=1, elas.=O.71, g=O.3; a second set of values with more domestic firms that produces the similar results is
n=25., n*=2, elas.=O.20, g=0.8.
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mark-up, because they can sell in two markets, they are able to sell more output and thereby earn
higher profits.
This asymmetry in the profits accruing to firms in two countries implies that there may be
reasons for specialization that are not in the least connected to demand conditions or production
technologies. It is important to remember that a difference in profitability between foreign and
dorestic firms can arise solely from the fact that there are more domestic firms than foreign ones.
Had the numbers of foreign and domestic firms been reversed, the profits of the foreign firms
would have been higher. This implies that if one country can develop a competitive industrial base
ahead of other countries, its firms will tend to dump into foreign markets and by so doing earn
higher profits even though they have no cost advantage in the production of the product.
Dumping at Prices Below Average Cost
Thus far, the analysis has treated dumping as if it were simply price discrimination and has
not addressed the issue of whether price discriminatory dumping differs from dumping at prices
below cost. While it should be clear from the structure of this model that it is not possible to ever
have situations in which firms dump at prices below marginal cost, it is possible to find cases in
which firms sell abroad at prices below average cost. Because firms dump, mark-ups must be
higher on sales in the domestic market than on sales in the foreign market. Now, if fixed costs are
high enough so that firms just break even, then each unit sold domestically must bring in more
revenue to cover the fixed costs than a unit sold abroad. However, this means that if firms break
even then all firms that dump will sell abroad using FOB prices that are below average cost. This
notion is formalized below.
Proposition 4 (Below Average Cost Dumping): If firms break even and dump, then the FOB
price will be below average cost.
Prof:
Suppose that domestic firms are dumping. This implies that p > p* -t. In addition since the firms
are breaking even, the following equation must also hold:
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F = (p - c)x + (p* - c/g)x*






Supoose that the proposition is not true, then
xp+x*p*-tx* <
x+x* -P
which can be rewritten as
xp + x*p* - tx* ( xp* - tx + x*p* - tx*
or
p p* - t
But this contradicts the initial assumption that firms were dumping in the foreign market.
Therefore, the proposition must be true.17
Often sanctions against firms that dump are based on evidence that the firm is selling
abroad at prices below cost. Proposition 4 states that not only is selling abroad at prices below
average cost not evidence for predatory dumping, but since more competitive industries are more
likefLy to be closer to the break even point, regulations that target firms that export at prices below
average cost may punish relatively competitive firms more than less competitive firms. This
analysis, therefore, suggests that the conventional justification for antidumping regulation may ib
corrmpletely backwards. We see from Propositions 2 and 3 that antidumping laws protect domestic
momopolies and oligopolies from relatively competitive foreign sectors. Furthermore, Proposition
4 irmdicates that the cases in which the laws and tariffs are applied with the most vigor-cases in
which the FOB price is below cost-are precisely the cases in which the foreign sector is likely to be
the mnost competitive.
171t iis interesting to note that like Proposition 1, Proposition 4 is a model-.free proposition that does not depend on
the asumptions neCessary for Propositions 2 and 3.
0
Conclusion
Although dumping has traditionally been seen as a phenomenon that is similar to predatory
pricing, in reality the practice may simply be a reflection of the tendency of competitive rent-
seeking firms to expand into less competitive markets that have high rents. Since selling abroad
does not lower prices in the domestic market, firms are willing to sell at lower profit margins
abroad (i.e. dump) whenever prices in a foreign market are sufficiently high to cover production
and transportation costs. The dumping of products from more competitive markets into less
competitive markets implies that even if production technologies and demand conditions are
identical, trade will arise as a means of equalizing rents in various national markets. However, it is
important to recognize that although this form of dumping equates the marginal revenues and
marginal costs of each firm, aggregate profits will depend vitally on whether the firm is based in a
flooded or non-flooded market.
If it is true that by flooding a market with firms a country can eliminate foreign entry and
have more profitable firms, then this provides additional support for arguments in favor of
developing infant industries and competitive industrial bases. The existence of large domestic
oligopolistic firms will generate significant rents in the domestic market that will tend to encourage
foreign firms to dump products into the home market and rive the trade account into the red.
Although careful empirical testing of this effect is difficult, there is some circumstantial evidence to
support the claim. A c"rsory glance at international industry concentration statistics reveals that
Japanese firms tend to be smaller and more numerous than US firms. For many years, many
analysts have held that Japanese firms try to maximize sales in some way at the expense of direct
profit maximization while US firms are only concerned about making very profitable sales.
According to this model, both the higher per sale mark-ups accruing to US firms as well as the
need of Japanese firms to obtain large market shares abroad should be linked closely with the
relative levels of competitiveness in the two markets. Thus, the explanation for why Japanese
firms constantly face charges of dumping, are able to achieve large mrket shares in the US, and
drive US firms out of business may be related to Japan's competitive domestic market structure.
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When policy makers speak of improving the competitiveness of US industries as a method
of reversing trade deficits usually they mean improving the efficiency of domestic firms: thereby
enabling them to produce at lower prices. The analysis of this paper suggests that increasing
domestic competition alone may achieve many of the results desired by governments without any
of the expensive subsidy programs that characterize current attempts to improve competitiveness of
industries. Furthermore, Japanese producers have long held that the factor that prevents US entry
into their markets is not tariff or non-tariff barriers against US products but rather highly
corrpetitive domestic industries. If the Japanese market is indeed relatively less concentrated than
the US market, then the model presented in this paper predicts that Japanese firms will tend to be
more successful in penetrating US markets than US firms in Japan.
While this form of dumping does tend to reduce individual firm profits to the point of
perhaps driving some companies into bankruptcy, the significantly lower prices that result from the
added competition greatly increase consumer surplus in both markets. Provided that a large
number of domestic firms do not go out of business as a result of the added competition and that
the loss of resources due to cross shipping goods is not too great, dumping will be beneficial to
consumers in both the long- and short-run and a welfare enhancing practice overall.
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